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Abstract 
 
The paper argues that the principal components of the Resource- Based View (R-BV) 
as a theory of sustained competitive advantage (SCA) are not a sufficient basis for a 
complete and consistent theory of firm behaviour. Two important missing elements 
are governance arrangements and value theory. Specifically the paper proposes a link 
between governance and value theory through a ‘modern labour theory of value’ 
(MLTV). The link operates first from the labour process, where value is created but is 
imperfectly observable by firm governance mechanisms and imposes monitoring 
costs. Second it operates through contractual arrangements which impose fixed cost 
structures on activities with variable revenues. The paper thereby explains how value 
originates in risky and difficult to monitor productive processes and is transmitted as 
rents to organizational and capital market constituents. It then reviews other recent 
contributions to the R-BV arguing that the SCA-MLTV approach overcomes some of 
the gaps inherent in the alternatives, and thus offers a more complete and integrated 
view of firm behaviour. 
 
Key words: Resource-based view, labour process theory, theory of value, 
governance, competitive advantage 
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Sustained Competitive Advantage and the Modern Labour Theory of Value  
The resource-based view (R-BV) explains the competitive advantage of organizations 
in terms of bundles of resources (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; Rumelt, 1984), which 
are valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable (VRIN) (Barney, 1991). It follows 
that the R-BV needs a theory of value if it is to be a convincing theory of competitive 
advantage. Competitive advantage is defined as delivering sustainable above-normal 
returns (Peteraf, 1993). For the purposes of the analysis that follows below, sustained 
competitive advantage (SCA) is defined as the process of delivering sustained 
abnormal returns to shareholders. Linking the R-BV and value theory offers the basis 
of a resource-based theory of the firm, where, following Grant (1996), the firm is an 
instrument for integrating individuals’ knowledge. The approach contributes to a 
theory of competitive heterogeneity, by offering a consistent theory of rents as a by-
product of a consistent theory of value. Because SCA is thereby linked to the notion 
of economic profit (Barney, 2002), a theory of value is required for the further reason 
of promoting the accurate computation of such profits. Recent theoretical literature, 
whilst acknowledging the requirement for a theory of value, has adopted two quite 
narrow and to some extent mutually exclusive perspectives. One strand examines 
processes within the organization (Denrell et al., 2003), which might be 
conceptualized in terms of production, transaction and governance costs (Madhok, 
2002). Another considers market interactions (Hoopes et al, 2003), particularly the 
division of value through bargaining games (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003a, 2003b, 
MacDonald and Ryall, 2004).  
The problems with the first approach are the reification of the firm, discovery 
of value in haphazard resource combinations, neglect of how separable stakeholder 
groups appropriate through governance processes and the need to make tautological 
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assumptions about capital values and discount rates a priori. The second strand tends 
to assume value and concentrate on its distribution, primarily between market place 
buyers and sellers, and between agents with ready-made products without hierarchy, 
history or stakeholder interests. A framework is required to assess and unify the 
elements contained in these diverse approaches. Some attempts have already been 
made, using the notions of value creation and value capture (Bowman and Ambrosini, 
2000), and these are developed further. 
The modern labour theory of value (MLTV), as presented here, offers an 
integrated framework to address many of the separate omissions of existing 
theoretical approaches. Classical labour theory of value (CLTV) suggests the source 
of value lies in human action in the productive process. The MLTV, which is a 
contribution of this paper, goes further, suggesting that whilst the CLTV proposition 
about the source of value is true, the value creation and value capture processes are 
boundedly stochastic. That is the value creation process is best observable by its 
capricious creator within the bounds of the organizational (or market) setting and 
progressively less observable (with increased monitoring cost) by those concerned 
with superintendence of the valorization process and the appropriation of surplus. In 
other words the modern MLTV, unlike its classical predecessor, is concerned with 
governance processes. It is consistent with Grant’s (1996) view that knowledge is 
created by the individual, whilst the firm is a mechanism for its application. An 
additional dimension of MLTV is the cost structure, which refers to the degree of 
variability arising from the employment contract. If employee remuneration is not 
precisely linked to revenue, the expected (risk adjusted) rate of profit includes a rent 
element. The reason is that either revenue falls and staff costs are paid anyway, in 
which case there is a labour rent, or revenue rises and staff costs remain fixed, in 
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which case profit rises above normal as labour’s share in net output falls. In summary, 
if the SCA approach to the R-BV is to be a core theory of business strategy, like any 
core theory, it requires an integration of transaction, production and governance costs 
(Williamson, 1991), and MLTV offers the means of such integration. 
The contribution of the paper is therefore to offer a theory of SCA based on a 
consistent theory of value. The remaining sections are structured as follows. The next 
section below presents an integrated model illustrating proposed relationships 
between the principal theoretical components. In a third section, the framework is 
used to assess recent major theoretical contributions to the valuation question in the 
competitive advantage literature and to consider what is necessary to provide a 
unifying theory. The discussion deals with the internal and value chain perspectives of 
Madhok (2002) and Denrell et al, (2003) and then moves on to consider the market-
based bargaining and payments perspectives of Lippman and Rumelt (2003a, 2003b) 
and the value price cost framework of Hoopes et al (2003). Whilst recognizing the 
contribution of each, the discussion highlights omissions which are addressable 
through the MLTV approach. Residual problems common to all theories, with 
particular focus on the capital measurement issue, are then addressed. A final section 
suggests areas for further research and draws conclusions. 
 
Knowledge, Value, and Appropriation: An Integrated Model  
As Grant (1996, p.112) suggests, a physiocratic approach, locating value in a single 
production factor along the lines of CLTV, is essential for a knowledge-based theory 
of value. Notwithstanding this assumption, Marx’s categorical extensions of Smith 
and Ricardo in the CLTV literature, for example, use-value and socially necessary 
labour, have been used sparingly in the debates on R-BV and value. There has been 
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little detailed engagement with classical economics (as an exception, see Bowman, 
2003), and little effort in general to extend the analysis of the classical economists.1 
 The current paper uses several components of classical and recent theory to 
develop the MLTV. The first is the fundamental link between socially necessary 
labour2, standard cost and replacement cost asset values (Bryer, 1999). These are the 
components of an underlying relationship between asset values and normal and 
abnormal rates of return, and hence sustained competitive advantage (SCA). These 
relationships are developed further to show that such returns are systematically related 
to cost structures embedded in the labour process. Second, the possibility of rent 
transfer between stakeholder groups (Coff, 1999). Consistent with Ricardo, rent is 
‘the difference between the produce obtained by the employment of two equal 
quantities of labour and capital’ (Marx, 1984, p.649). Extending this notion, where 
knowledge is unevenly distributed within firms and between firms and their investors, 
rents accrue to firm insiders or financial market insiders based on access to superior 
information. Because firm insiders are employees and managers, the realized wage is 
the socially required rate for the job plus or minus rent elements arising from access 
to information asymmetries in the production process and contract related cost 
structures. Conversely, realized returns accruing to shareholders in a financial market 
reflect both the underlying rate of profit plus or minus realizable managerial and 
labour rents.3 The third component is the consideration of tacit knowledge. 
Employees hold their positions because the perceived value of their tacit and other 
knowledge exceeds their market cost. In R-BV terms, the firm that employs such 
individuals has a basis for SCA because a competing firm cannot replicate the asset 
base through straightforward market exchange processes. The problems for 
management are observing, controlling and valorizing what is done with that time and 
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this problem intensifies to the extent that subordinates hold tacit knowledge. These 
problems lead to the fourth component, which is the process of organizational control 
and the mix between behaviour and output controls (Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). The 
balance shifts from the former to the latter, to the extent that process observation by 
supervisors is problematic. Fifth, as the labour process is not directly observable, the 
employer of labour and the capital market investor are exposed to financial risk 
arising from information asymmetry. Each of these five points is developed in more 
detail below. 
Finally, before presenting the model, some discussion is necessary about the 
most important underlying assumption of both CLTV and MLTV that the source of 
value is attributable to human action within the productive process.4 Because 
commodities are systematically sold at higher prices on leaving the productive 
process in comparison to the prices at which they enter it, there must be some 
commodity within the process that adds value systematically. Without this condition 
aggregate profits are zero and the economy is a zero sum game. Further, labour time 
is priced in the market, but labour power is not. Specifically therefore labour time is 
transferred to the product with a degree of intensity that is a function of both physical 
effort and mental processes. MLTV places appropriate emphasis on the mental 
processes, so that senior managers as well as junior staff spend time creating value, 
specifically where their administrative activities are a necessary condition for 
productive activity to occur.5 Productive activity is all activity that adds value 
including service provision, not just factory production. 
As long as the labour process is defined to include both mental and physical 
processes, this view is consistent with Schumpeter’s (1934) argument that value and 
abnormal profits arise from innovation. As long as the value created from such mental 
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and physical activities is greater than the market value of labour time, the firm has an 
incentive to retain the employees whose individual or collective efforts generate the 
value. At the same time the firm has the basis for making abnormal returns and 
therefore SCA.  
To develop a theory of SCA from a MLTV perspective, it is necessary to 
establish a basic relationship between individual knowledge and the means whereby it 
is embedded in the labour process, and subsequent monitoring and valorization. 
Physical effort and readily quantifiable skills are the resources most easily replicable. 
Such explicit skills are those more easily generated through generic training and 
education processes external to the firm. As labour processes become more deeply 
ingrained as tacit skills, they become more difficult to replicate. Super-normal profits 
consistent with the organizational aspects of SCA (Barney, 1991) arise from firm 
specific assets, managerial economies of scope, and organizational mechanisms of co-
ordination (Penrose, 1959, Teece, 1980, Coff, 1997).6 As the firm invests in assets 
such as specialized production facilities, trade secrets and engineering experience 
(Teece et al 1997) over time (Dierickx and Cool, 1989), tacit knowledge is embedded 
in technically complex routines. According to the knowledge-based view SCA arises 
from such routines (Spender, 1989, Nonaka, 1991), but recognition that individuals 
create the knowledge, which firms can then apply (Grant, 1996) leads in the MLTV to 
a tension between rent appropriation by individuals and team-based profit 
appropriation as SCA.7  
Ambrosini and Bowman (2001, p.816) suggest a continuum with explicit and 
deeply ingrained skills at either end. However, they do not incorporate specific 
governance and control mechanisms that would allow a specific stakeholder group, 
for example shareholders, to engage in systematic value capture. Figure 1 uses this 
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continuum to include tacit knowledge as a starting point, but extends the analysis to 
include the important additional dimension of task complexity in the labour process, 
and cost behaviour, monitoring costs, control mechanisms and appropriation in the 
valorization process. In other words, to consider the relationship between knowledge 
location and value appropriation as part of a full description of the productive process, 
set out in figure 1 as a horizontal continuum of dimensions of value creation through 
to ultimate value capture. 
  
Figure 1 about here 
 
The valorization process comprises four elements: cost behaviour, control, 
monitoring, and appropriation. Insofar as specific assets associated with SCA are not 
valued in an external market, and are therefore illiquid and non-realisable, they 
generate fixed costs rather than variable costs. Similarly the cost of hiring knowledge 
intensive labour generates fixed cost. Therefore as tacit knowledge and the potential 
degree of SCA rises under R-BV assumptions, so does the fixity of cost. As suggested 
in figure 1, there is also a continuous relationship between the degree of tacitness and 
complexity in the labour process and the ability of external stakeholders to monitor 
the separable labour processes that make up the firm and their joint interactions. This 
follows from the definition of tacit knowledge, because the process is less readily 
explainable and understood by an outsider and is consistent with the R-BV, tacit 
knowledge is implicated in SCA. External stakeholders’ two methods of monitoring, 
behavioural (or action) and output control are also implicated in the tacitness and 
complexity of the labour process, and the extent of fixed production costs and 
monitoring costs in the valorization process. Tasks that are simple to perform and 
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replicate are more easily subjected to control through the division of labour and 
repetition, and more easily flexed in response to changes in demand, so there is 
greater emphasis on action control. Where the process is complex, difficult to observe 
and dependent on embedded fixed costs, rather than costly monitoring a process that 
is difficult to understand and unresponsive to changes in demand, output control 
might be relied upon, so that the producer has to account for actions in financial 
terms. In the latter case, there is an additional element in the labour process, which 
involves the transformation of heterogeneous physical and mental inputs into 
homogeneous monetary outputs. Following Ouchi and Maguire (1975), behaviour and 
output controls may not be direct substitutes, but may be observable in independent 
contexts depending on understanding of means-ends relationships and complex 
interdependencies respectively. Finally, as far as appropriation is concerned, the more 
tacit labour processes create assets that are unique, valuable, through processes that 
generate difficult to monitor fixed costs, the more likely resulting abnormal profit will 
be appropriated by insiders. Inside appropriation is at the expense of external capital 
providers or at the expense of other participants in joint ventures and consortia. 
 There are several interesting corollaries arising from these relationships that 
are worth mentioning. First there is a conflict between the managerial objective of 
achieving SCA and the objective of maximizing shareholder value. Managers pursue 
rents rather than optimal growth (Rugman and Verbeke, 2004) and these rents arise 
from their role in the labour process, as supervisors and participants. If firms are 
identified as having achieved competitive advantage by reference to accounting ratios 
corresponding to superior performance from a shareholder perspective (eg Peters and 
Waterman, 1982), it is likely that such performance is based on explicit and easily 
replicable skills and that associated competitive advantage is short-term or illusory.  
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A second and related point is that monitoring costs in figure 1 also lie on a 
continuum suggesting that as the degree of tacitness rises, the probability of surplus 
appropriation by those closest to the labour process also rises. In other words the 
monitoring problem is not simply confined to the providers of external capital but is 
also faced directly by the line managers at each hierarchical level above the labour 
process. Line managers have the incentive to externalize tacit knowledge embedded in 
labour processes for which they are responsible, for example through the division of 
labour, or spend organizational resources themselves on monitoring, so that rents 
accrue at their level of the hierarchy. Insofar as line management itself is part of the 
labour process, for example where managerial action alters the product or service 
delivered, further individually appropriable tacit knowledge arises and monitoring 
costs are imposed from above on progressively senior levels of management. 
Ultimately the imposition comes from the capital market to the top of the hierarchy, 
creating a similar but separate set of monitoring issues discussed below. 
A third corollary is that under these assumptions the SCA-MLTV approach is 
made consistent with labour process theory (LPT). R-BV and LPT are from divergent 
backgrounds within the strategic management literature, reflecting context and 
process based approaches respectively. To clarify the consistency, it is necessary to 
evaluate the assumptions from the labour process perspective. The most important 
consideration for many labour process theorists (eg Knights, 1990, Wilmott, 1990) is 
the role of power rather than profit. Their consequent rejection of Marx’s value 
categories explains the divergence between LPT and the CLTV (Rowlinson and 
Hassard, 2001, p.90). As Nicholls (1999) has pointed out, the valorization stage, 
which is concerned with the transformation of labour use values into realized profit, 
of the productive process has been neglected in the labour process literature. Figure 1 
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suggests an integrated approach, since labour rent originates in the productive 
process, and a valorization stage is included. In terms of labour time, capital 
comprises accumulated dead labour plus the living labour time, at whatever intensity, 
transferred into output through the labour process. Capital can be conceptualized in 
labour hours without reference to valorization, but the valorization process is 
nonetheless the crucial link underpinning the relationship between tacit knowledge 
and monitoring costs. Precise valorization is the outcome of two elements, realization 
into monetary or exchange value through capital circulation (per Marx, 1976, p.992-7) 
and under MLTV assumptions, the effectiveness or otherwise of supervisory 
arrangements to moderate the effects of information asymmetry. Asymmetry arises 
because workers sell but retain control over their ‘labour power’, defined by Marx as 
those physical and mental capabilities, which the worker sets in motion whenever 
producing a use-value (1976, p.271).  
These assumptions are consistent with CLTV and specifically with Marx, if 
the labour process is treated as part of the productive forces (Marx, 1976, pp.285-
290), which also incorporate knowledge assets, for example scientific expertise where 
applied using technology (Marx, 1974, pp.540, 699, 706). Meanwhile the labour 
process leads to inventiveness on the one hand through the imagination of individual 
labourers at the outset of the labour process (Marx, 1976, pp.284) and alienation 
through the process of specialization on the other. In the MLTV extension, to the 
extent that inventiveness and knowledge can be individually appropriated, the labour 
process itself becomes a risky set of activities for administering managers and outside 
financial stakeholders.  
Arising from these risks, a fourth implication is the impact on capital market 
participants such as individual shareholders and investment managers. As suggested 
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above, realization through capital circulation is assumed to be part of the valorization 
process. At the top end of the continuum where all knowledge is tacit, it is impossible 
for the investor to understand the processes whereby use values are transformed into 
exchange values through realization and thereby generated into profits. Even so, 
where there is some degree of capital dependence (Prechel, 2000), for example in 
high growth sector firms, insiders will have an incentive to reserve some profit and 
signal its availability to outside investors instead of appropriating it for themselves. 
Insofar as the labour process within one firm is unrelated to those governing the 
profits of the average firm, which include many explicit processes, the variation in 
profit will appear random and therefore as ‘noise’. Such randomness corresponds to 
the firm-specific risk.8 In the limiting case where all knowledge is tacit, all share 
prices become random. Under such conditions, following Grossman and Stiglitz, 
(1980), share prices would convey no information to investors. In the opposite case 
where all knowledge is explicit, information is symmetrical and markets become thin, 
as there are no abnormal returns (rents) and there is no incentive to trade (Grossman 
and Stiglitz, 1980). Also under these conditions with R-BV assumptions all firms 
possess the same easily imitable resources for the same activities and there is no SCA. 
These intra-firm and firm-financial market interactions provide the possibility 
of theory of profit determination consistent with notions of competitive advantage and 
the MLTV. Abstracting from the continua in Figure 1, a model showing the 
relationship between the labour cost characteristics of tacit knowledge, task 
complexity and valorization process characteristics, and expected profits consumed by 
external investors can be developed. Figure 2 shows the rate of return required by a 
risk-averse external investor as a function of the fixed cost labour ratio (FCLR). The 
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FCLR is the proportion of fixed cost to total cost for firm i divided by the proportion 
of fixed cost to total cost for all firms. 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Some abstraction will assist with conceptualization. Suppose a firm with a 
single employee, w and a single shareholder, s and that the actions of w can be made 
totally observable or explicit to s and through contractual/legal arrangements w has no 
bargaining power. Suppose also that s pays w only for the output actually produced 
(as opposed to for the time w spends at work). Under these assumptions,9 s is able to 
appropriate profits from the labour process under risk free conditions. If fairly 
efficient capital markets are also assumed, the rate of profit should resemble the social 
rate of return from risk free investment (point A in figure 2), for example base interest 
rates.10 It can also be seen that if these assumptions are gradually relaxed, so that w is 
able, through the acquisition of bargaining power, to fix wages in the face of varying 
demand conditions, then the rate of profit required to compensate the rational investor 
will rise. Because the variability of the realised rate of profit increases proportionately 
to the degree of fixity in wage cost, even where diversified, investors will require, and 
should obtain where capital markets remain reasonably efficient, a proportionate 
increase in compensation (for the average risk firm, to point B in figure 2).11 There is 
a systematic increase insofar as under conditions of aggregate growth the expected 
change in aggregate demand is positive in which case because wages are fixed, 
realised profits rise. An important reason for the positive linear association between 
fixity of labour cost and shareholder risk is that according to implicit contract theory, 
employees are more risk averse (Rosen, 1985). Therefore in this model, the capital 
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market absorbs the insurance element of implicit labour contracts through a risk 
premium. These results are theoretically consistent with the Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), in that stock return is 
proportionate to systematic risk. The difference is that the risk source is related to 
value creation, labour process and value appropriation, rather than mere share price 
and stock market index co-variation.  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Suppose next that w has tacit knowledge and can conceal value creating or 
value destroying activities in the labour process, so that the effort bargain shifts in 
favour of w and the return to s corresponds to point C in figure 2. Again, s faces 
increased risk, but the increase is specific to the labour process and s avoids this risk 
by incurring monitoring costs or shifting to output control, for example setting a target 
normal rate of profit based on observable rates elsewhere. These rates reflect, and are 
reduced by, aggregate monitoring cost. Alternatively, s avoids the risk through 
portfolio diversification, but in doing so reduces the capacity further for monitoring 
the performance of any one firm. Purchases of other shares also run the risk of 
negative rents through premium prices charged by market makers, benefiting from 
inside or asymmetric information advantages (point D in figure 2). In general, points 
C and D constitute examples of rents arising from non R-BV sources, such as 
monopoly power, information asymmetry and other elements of competitive 
heterogeneity. 
The interactions between tacit knowledge and monitoring costs are suggestive 
of some interesting contradictions within the corporate economy. Alienation, through 
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excessive specialization and associated removal of intellectual content, is traditionally 
viewed as a source of exploitation by unscrupulous profit maximizing capitalists. In 
fact, in industries where such exploitation might occur, such as cotton textiles in the 
British industrial revolution or in modern China, although aggregate profit rates may 
be high, there is no basis for SCA at the level of any individual firm.12 In contrast, 
where the labour process has significant intellectual content, thereby creating entry 
barriers for competitors, the accrued profit to the individual maximizing capitalist 
may be still small and the rents accrued by intermediate producers and market-makers 
large, due to increased monitoring problems.13 In short, because rent is the difference 
between realized price and underlying value, if labour is the source of value, 
information asymmetry is the source of rent. Trade-offs between the two tend to 
equalize the aggregate rate of profit.14
 
Figure 3 about here 
 
Figure 3a shows a formal decomposition of total observed profits into profit 
and rent elements. Following figure 2, there is a risk free profit element, to which is 
added a labour rent based systematic premium equating to the FLCR. Further rents 
arise from knowledge-based asymmetries within the production process and as a 
residual category, from other non-labour based resources. Consistent with the 
economic theory advanced so far, total observed profit consists of normal profit plus 
rents. Normal profit, following figure 2, corresponds to average levels of fixed labour 
cost. To the extent that the individual firm has a FLCR higher than average, it earns a 
systematically higher rent, which forms the first component of MLTV-based 
abnormal return. The second component arises from knowledge-based production 
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process asymmetries. SCA associated with the MLTV, consistent with the R-BV, is 
the distance B – 0. Further rents, which are accrued through heterogeneous access to 
other physical and informational assets (C – B), are not part of an R-BV story of SCA, 
but are consistent with competitive heterogeneity. Where such rents are present, they 
will complement other categories of rent, thereby increasing total observed profit, or 
will increase profit in the absence of other categories. 
Figure 3b shows how these trade offs within a MLTV R-BV framework 
explain the observed level of profit and shows when and how observed abnormal 
profits are associated with SCA. Coff’s (1999, figure 1) model provides examples of 
these trade-offs locating rents specifically in stakeholder bargaining power, asset 
specificity and team complexity.  Figure 3b shows the general case that follows from 
the above discussion, in which profits and SCA are explained jointly by tacit 
knowledge VRIN assets in the resource base and the process of surplus appropriation. 
The framework shows the labour and valorization processes to be in direct and 
dynamic contradiction. In the top row of the table, consistent with the R-BV, firms 
achieve SCA through their tacit knowledge resources. However, observable profits 
differ, so that where external monitoring and accountability is effective the profits 
from SCA are above normal levels and accrue to external stakeholders (quadrant 1). 
Where monitoring and accountability are ineffective, rents accrue to insiders 
(quadrant 2). Reported profits will be normal, since insiders will report and distribute 
the level of profit required for minimally satisfying investors and preventing them 
from exiting their investment. Remaining surplus will be consumed as rents by the 
insiders. On the bottom row, there are no VRIN assets and therefore there is no basis 
for SCA. Because there are no VRIN assets, rent appropriation by insiders is also 
ruled out. Profits are therefore normal in both quadrants 3 and 4. In quadrant 4, losses 
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(ie less than normal profits) are possible if managers seek to appropriate rents and are 
not well monitored, but only in the very short-run. Because there are no VRIN 
knowledge assets, the normal rate of profit is well known and therefore deviations 
below the rate are easy to police. Insofar as SCA and abnormal profits only occur 
consistently in quadrant 1, governance arrangements can be seen as contributing to 
observable competitive advantage. Of course even here the trade-offs referred to in 
figure 1 still apply, so that increased investment in VRIN assets also increases 
monitoring costs. Therefore abnormal profits and SCA are only concurrent where 
governance mechanisms are cost-effective. In short, heterogeneous value creation 
processes and cost-effective governance processes are jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions for SCA. 
There are relatively few devices available to outside investors to ensure that 
their firm operates in quadrant 1. An example might be to recruit outside directors 
with sufficient independence from the main board but who at the same time possess 
the sector-specific expertise required to monitor knowledge based assets. However, in 
the general case, availability of such directors suggests inter-firm knowledge sharing 
which is in itself inconsistent with firm-level SCA. One further possibility is the use 
of ideology, and notions such as ‘shareholder value maximization’. Arguably, such 
notions might be more easily shared between outside investors and the firm’s top 
management. Top management might therefore employ ideology to mitigate 
apparently selfish utilization of tacit knowledge to consume wealth within the 
organization, consistent with Penrose’s view that firms and their managers are 
essentially profit-orientated, and that managerial opportunism and the agency problem 
constitute only a special case (Lockett and Thompson, 2004). However, the there is 
little rational basis for managerial pursuit of abnormal profit, since it derives from a 
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contradictory appeal to the selfish interests of another group, ie the shareholders, and 
because normal rather than abnormal profits are a sufficient basis for the survival of 
the firm. 
The trade-offs in figures 1,2 and 3 explain why capitalism is a dynamic system 
operating within social and technically determined limits. There is an incentive to 
invest in knowledge assets insofar as the marginal product is positive net of 
monitoring costs. Because tacitness can rise to the point of total opacity there is an 
upward limit on the level of investment. Similarly there is a downward limit to 
alienation, since if all processes are explicit, although monitoring costs are zero, 
individual firms cannot achieve SCA under R-BV assumptions.15 The realized rate of 
profit for the firm, as an asset bundle, depends on the interaction of these 
contradictions, but is unrelated to the competence or otherwise of the firm’s 
management, who, where rational will appropriate surpluses privately. The rate of 
surplus accruing to individual workers and managers depends on the possession of 
knowledge and the monitoring cost.  
 
COMPARISON OF THE MLTV-SCA WITH OTHER APPROACHES 
 
Implications for transaction cost economics and the resource based theory 
The above analysis to some extent parallels Madhok’s (2002) response to 
Williamson’s (1991) call for the integration of transaction cost, production cost and 
governance skills. However there are important differences and the model developed 
above forms a useful basis to critique the approach adopted by Madhok and the wider 
limitations of transaction cost and traditional resource-based approaches. 
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 Madhok (2002) re-examines the work of Adler and colleagues (Adler, 1993, 
Adler and Borys, 1996; Adler et al 1999) concerning the General Motors/Toyota joint 
venture (NUMMI) and its relationship with suppliers. He argues the case illustrates 
that the conventional trade-off between production and governance efficiency can be 
spurious where inter-firm transactions benefit from resource complementarity and 
appropriate deployment of governance skills. Such an outcome is entirely possible, 
but is not well supported by Madhok’s argument. First, his model supposes that ‘the 
firm’ is able to judge the value of the productive resources of both parties (Madhok, 
2002, p.545, emphasis added). The reification of the firm as a set of governance 
arrangements is a limitation of the transaction cost approach, and as Grant (1996) 
suggests in the knowledge-based view where organizations are reified as routines. 
There is especially a problem where knowledge, and access to knowledge is 
asymmetric, between principal and agent, and between joint-venture and supplier 
management groups. Moreover, ‘the firm’s judgement’ of value abstracts from the 
valorization process and the hierarchical governance of these processes in the 
organization.  
Second, the ‘governance skills’, which can lead to mutual enhancement of 
production skills, are defined vaguely as the ‘skills involved in structuring and 
managing the exchange relationship’ (Madhok, 2002, p.545). Again there is a 
problem of reification because such skills are ‘possessed’ by the firm (Madhok, 2002, 
p.546). To refine the approach, it is important to clarify who possesses such skills. 
Skill involved in structuring the exchange relationship implies understanding and 
knowledge of accountability systems, including mechanisms for controlling the 
valorization process, valuing the resulting output and measuring performance. The 
ability to impose such systems implies asymmetrical possession of governance skills 
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across principal agent groups and from one firm to another, likely to be a function of 
power differentials and access to knowledge, ranging from the tacit to the technically 
explicit. A further problem with Madhok’s governance skills, linked to their 
reification, is the absence of any consideration of shareholder-based governance 
mechanisms. The implication is that investors (individual shareholders and fund 
managers) also possess governance skills, although Madhok does not address the 
point. He therefore oversimplifies the question of combined (or commingled) risky 
assets, arguing that costs associated with them become more variable. More likely is 
that as relationship specific investments in the partnership reduce transaction cost 
through information sharing, trust, and production efficiency (Madhok, 2002, p.545), 
then costs become more fixed; a consequence likely to be enhanced from the portfolio 
effects of combining risky assets. Also the outside investor is faced with potentially 
higher variability not in costs, but in profit. Following the logic of the reformulated 
CAPM in figure 2 above, the variability of shareholder cash flow increases where 
costs are fixed.16 As suggested by MLTV-SCA framework, investors are more likely 
to be required to invest in governance skills, at cost to themselves, to prevent the 
greater appropriation of profit by insiders when costs are fixed, since they bear greater 
risk otherwise. In this fashion investor’s transaction costs are aggregated with 
production costs and are a function of the increased risk arising from the joint venture. 
Risk and associated governance cost place an upward limit on the process of market 
to hierarchy substitution, limiting the extent of vertical integration. Conversely, 
hierarchy to market substitution increases cost variability, thereby making the rate of 
profit relatively fixed and reducing governance costs but also undermining the basis 
of SCA, since any given set of activities becomes more easily replicable. The rate of 
profit therefore resembles normal profit. Madhok’s contribution is to show that cases 
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such as NUMMI represent a possible optimum compromise in terms of transaction 
cost reduction. The extension of his framework to include investors would show 
whose transaction cost. 
Third, Madhok argues if the resource-based perspective is applied to vertical 
relationships, competitive advantage is enhanced because the supplier becomes a 
resource and a strategic asset (2002, p.545). However, in RB-V terms, this can only 
be the case if the asset is valuable, and the implication is that there is a transfer of 
value from the supplier to the purchasing firm. If purchasing firm managers have 
governance skills, they can valorize them by imposing a behaviour control based 
accountability system on the supplier, but this involves an offsetting monitoring cost. 
However if the personnel of one firm can have governance skills, it follows that the 
other firm’s personnel can have them too. Thus if the managers and employees of the 
supplier firm are able to use their governance skills to appropriate the value created in 
production for themselves, then neither the supplier itself nor the governance skills of 
the managers in the purchasing company can be valuable R-BV assets contributing to 
SCA. Without an R-BV explanation, the success of NUMMI is reduced to transaction 
cost based explanations of quasi-vertical integration, ie repeat transactions, 
relationship specific investments etc. To contribute anything, the R-BV needs its own 
theory of value creation and value capture. 
Fourth, in Madhok’s framework behaviour can be ‘other-oriented’ or self-
interested, where following Adler, (2001), the parties’ preferences are endogenous to 
the social processes of the relationship. Again this abstracts from the implied uneven 
distribution of power and knowledge between participants. Where powerful 
purchasers engage ‘proactively’ with suppliers, mechanisms for passing on the cost of 
quality control and for fixing the transfer price usually accompany. Suppliers and 
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employees might transfer value in this fashion to more powerful parties, but not out of 
the conscious philanthropy implied by ‘other-orientation’. In MLTV-SCA framework, 
it is also true that social processes are endogenous, as in the labour process, which is 
characterised as a co-operative activity on the one hand and a process of individual 
value appropriation on the other, with no assumption required other than rational self-
interested behaviour. 
 Fifth, Madhok suggests that rents may differ according to which supplier is 
chosen, even though otherwise the transaction characteristics are the same across all 
transactions, simply because rents attached to a particular resource combination may 
be particularly valuable. Again, this raises the questions of the determinants of value, 
how measured, and of value to whom? If it is assumed that valuable resources in 
differing combinations yield differing combined rents, it still begs the question of why 
the individual resources have value in the first place?17 If the NUMMI strategy does 
lead to differential performance, how will this be measured and by whom? In MLTV, 
value arises from the labour processes that are combined and co-ordinated. 
Differential rent, in the case of combined assets, follows Ricardo’s definition and 
reflects the outcome of power and information asymmetries in the valorization and 
appropriation processes. 
 The approach SCA-MLTV approach agrees with Madhok’s on a sixth point, 
which is that net economic surplus reflects rents from superior performance minus 
transactional inefficiencies. Indeed, the trade-off underpins figures 1, 2 and 3 above. It 
is important for the development of a core theory of business strategy that the 
elements in Madhok’s paper are combined as he suggests, and to do so, as suggested 
here a core theory of value reconcilable with the analysis of governance is required. 
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Although addressing the process of value creation, Denrell et al. (2003) share 
the reified perspective of Madhok. Where they do consider individual agents, instead 
of merely the firm they are entrepreneurs discovering strategic opportunities through 
serendipitous assemblages of existing sub-systems of knowledge. Such discoveries 
would appear to be consistent with managerial rent consumption opportunities, since 
it is they who have closest access to, or direct possession of, appropriable knowledge 
and internal arbritage opportunities. Denrell et al. (2003) lack a robust theory of value 
when examining the valuation of complex resources. They assume that all stage 
transformations through intermediate to finished products require only labour cost and 
that such labour is undifferentiated. They also assume that all prices are in present 
value terms. It follows that the discount rate, or more precisely, the risk-adjusted rate 
of profit is presupposed. If it is necessary to assume wage rates, prices and profit rates 
a priori, in a model with two factors of production, labour and capital, it is difficult to 
see how this model rigorously adds to the theory of value.  
 
The bargaining and payments perspective 
The bargaining and payments perspectives of Lippman and Rumelt (L&R) (2003a; 
2003b and see also Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) are to a certain extent similar to 
the SCA-MLTV approach. However there are also significant differences and SCA-
MLTV offers some extensions. The most fundamental difference is that the L&R 
approach lacks an underlying theory of value creation. The bargaining approach 
assumes a surplus (L&R 2003b, p.1071, emphasis added). Alternatively for the 
payments perspective, (L&R 2003a) economic profit is set at zero, presumably for all 
firms in aggregate, implying differences in price and cost sum to zero, or revenues ≡ 
payments. At the aggregate level, these are merely wealth transfers, implying that 
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revenue at time t is the same as revenue at t-1, whereas innovative activity implies 
wealth creation and a positive sum game in the aggregate.  MLTV offers an 
explanation as to why on aggregate the value of purchased outputs is systematically 
higher than purchased inputs, and, by corollary, implies that labour does not receive 
payment equivalent to value.  
The L&R analysis therefore needs extension to consider employment relations 
within the firm. L&R suggest that a farmer (and, to extend their argument for present 
purposes, an employee within a firm) might through specialized tacit knowledge 
create and therefore appropriate the associated increase in net revenue. However true 
this might be of an independent farmer, the ability of an employee to appropriate 
value is mitigated by the effectiveness or otherwise of monitoring mechanisms and 
the transformation of individual tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge through time 
as a function of organizational learning and team-based incentives. Such an extension 
seems consistent with L&R since where labour is embedded in the firm, co-
specialization is implied. In other words, the innovative employee is dependent upon 
access to some element of the firm’s resource bundle, otherwise as L&R suggest, each 
person would simply appropriate their own contribution (2003b, p.1083). In co-
specialization cases, L&R invoke Williamson's (1985) ‘fundamental transformation’, 
where competition is replaced by bilateral negotiation.  
According to L&R (2003b), the outcome of these negotiations depends on 
their structure as a bargaining game. A condition is that the game should have a 
core,18 otherwise the participants lack the incentive to work together for a co-
operatively beneficial outcome. Where an innovative employee possesses tacit 
knowledge, it is unlikely that person will enter the game unless the firm’s incentive 
structure is such that the employee will appropriate a significant share of the revenues. 
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Where ex ante contracts of employment specify the ownership and rewards from 
innovation as proprietary to the firm, these incentives will not exist. Such restrictions 
are consistent with L&R examples which introduce a core, for example a veto or 
restricted access to a key resource (2003b, p.1079). Assets that achieve this, such as 
proprietary technology and large fixed asset bases, restrict access from the employees’ 
point of view and prevent them setting up a competing firm. At the same time, they 
ensure inequality in bilateral bargaining gains, encouraging indirect rent 
appropriation. The appropriation process in this case, outlined in the MLTV, arises 
from non co-operation by the innovative employee and imperfect surveillance of 
effort by the employer, so that rent arising from innovation and greater efficiency is 
appropriated within the firm through equivalent shirking. An alternative contractual 
arrangement, which gives the employee incentive to share information, places a core 
in the game, but with the risk that the employee appropriates the monetary benefit.  
As suggested earlier, these problems are compounded where there are multiple 
hierarchical layers and equivalent opportunities for appropriation by middle 
managers. Monitoring problems are most acute between the firm’s strategic apex and 
the investor, since the managers at the strategic apex have access to the most powerful 
and comprehensive surveillance mechanisms within the firm, which they will 
rationally share with outside investors only when it is to their advantage. Because 
outside shareholders can only apply output controls to top management, they must 
rely on monetary representations of results, leaving top management, crucially, in 
control of the process of transformation of heterogeneous capital resource into 
homogeneous cash flow equivalent representations. Therefore top management also 
have the ability to promote internal reinvestment of profits from innovation into 
perquisites at the expense of dividend payments to shareholders. Also the way in 
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which the firm’s managerial hierarchy exercises surveillance is potentially important, 
through access control or incentivisation (respectively examples of action and output 
controls, Ouchi and Maguire, 1975). It is in this area that the L&R analysis can be 
most usefully extended.  
A further possible extension is to consider the value of the investment from 
the shareholder’s point of view and hence SCA as the discounted value of future 
simple rent payments. However, from the MLTV perspective this value is impacted 
by the risk implicit in future cash flows. Such risk is determined by the ability of other 
resource providers to fix their cash flow through contractual arrangements (thereby 
rendering the cash flow to the residual group more variable) and by the problem of 
asymmetric information.  
A final problematic aspect of L&R’s (2003a, p.924) analysis is their 
concluding objective function, that the firm should maximize its wealth and that 
competition will induce it to maximize payments for scarce resources (PSR). Hiding 
behind this reification is a simultaneous managerialist and anti-managerialist view of 
the firm. The managerialist view is implied by the notion of the firm (as opposed to 
the shareholder) as a repository of wealth. If the firm is to maximize PSR, the 
implication is that if managerial labour and knowledge are scarce resources, managers 
must do nothing other than define themselves as scarce, talented and valuable, and 
maximize their own welfare. In the anti-managerialist view, the forces of competition 
induce PSR maximization, so there is no room for managerial discretion. However, 
the implication is that if competition is inhibited by some degree of monopoly, then 
realized PSR is merely a function of market structure. Such an outcome is equally 
explained by the CLTV theory of differential rent.  
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A final problem is the definition of PSR as a residual category, once payments 
of commodity inputs (PCI) and payments for commodity resources (PCR) have been 
accounted for. Because the other two categories are defined as commodities, they are 
also defined to be in perfectly elastic supply. If Revenue = PCI + PCR + PSR (L&R, 
p.924) and the firm is a price taker in two out of the three categories, then changes in 
PSR can only be explained with reference to themselves, which removes any analytic 
properties from the identity. If on the other hand, perfect competition is as defined by 
Makowski and Ostroy (1995) and L&R (2003b, p.1071), as a condition in which 
individuals fully appropriate the value they create, then market imperfection implies 
the transfer of surplus through rent (per Ricardo) rather than value. It also follows that 
if individuals do not fully appropriate the value they create in a market relation other 
than perfect competition, this will also by the case in an employment relation. To 
make the latter point, MLTV, which includes labour rents, does better than Ricardo 
and the sections of the R-BV literature that ignore the creation of value through 
human action. Where not dealing with the employment relation this part of L&R’s 
argument is quite similar to classical arguments. Marx extended Ricardo’s theory of 
rent to explain, in similar fashion to L&R, why for example a landowner might 
restrict access to an entrepreneur in order to share surplus from a business idea 
through the notion of ground rent. Or how an entrepreneur with an imitable business 
idea but unique access to land earns rent through the prevention of further 
development (Dobb, 1973; see also Marx 1984, part VI). 
 
The value price cost (VPC) framework 
The VPC approach differentiates between value, defined as the price the customer is 
willing to pay; price, which is a function of supply and demand; and cost, which is the 
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cost of production. The framework assumes V > P > C, which is likely to be true 
when individual cases of competitive advantage are considered, and competitive 
advantage might arise in individual cases of V > P and P > C (Hoopes et al. 2003).  
However, in the aggregate V = P = C, otherwise it is not clear why customers would 
systematically value all products and services above their cost of production. The 
equality of VPC in the aggregate is also consistent with the payments perspective 
(L&R, 2003a), but inconsistent with an underlying theory of value creation. If V is 
systematically higher than C in the aggregate in price terms, then firms must be 
acquiring a resource for a price below its cost. The only resource all firms share 
common access to is human resource. As we have seen, it is this resource in particular 
that not only creates value through intellectual and physical effort, but such effort is 
also problematic to measure and observe, unlike the costs of other inputs. 
 In similar fashion to the VPC approach, MacDonald and Ryall (M&R) (2004) 
attempt to show that value arises from the presence of a willing buyer. There are some 
interesting corollaries, not least from the R-BV perspective that VRIN assets are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for SCA. In the case presented (M&R, 
2004, p.1321), the cost of production is normalized to zero and the buyer’s utility is 
set at 1. To presuppose utility at a level greater than the cost of production, is 
however, non-generalizable, since without equivalent payments to production factors 
utility cannot constitute effective demand. If the case is merely specific then the 
bargaining game is a question of rent sharing between firm and buyer, rather than 
value creation. Consistent with M&R, the appropriation of value depends on the 
number of firms and buyers. As in many interpretations that analyse at the level of the 
firm, there is reification and no consideration of rent splits within the oganization. As 
with L&R, the M&R analysis could be extended to include the employment relation, 
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so that bargaining is represented as an interaction between the employee and 
employer as a buyer of labour. 
 
Problems in capital measurement 
The theories of transaction cost, competitive heterogeneity, the RBV and their 
extensions through the bargaining and payments perspectives rely on the notion of 
scarcity as the determination of value. All therefore share the same capital 
measurement problem. Consistent with the basic RBV premisses, if assets are 
imitable, then profit rates will fall as new firms enter. Or alternatively, there is an 
inverse and monotonic relationship between the quantity of capital and the rate of 
return (Samuelson, 1962). However, this relationship can only be sustained if physical 
(by definition homogeneous) measures of capital are used and there is a one way 
causal link between capital quantity and the consequent rate of profit. A method of 
capital valuation is required if we are interested in valuing heterogeneous capital 
goods (Wicksell, 1934), as is necessary if we are to apply the R-BV. Conventionally, 
the valuation is the present value of the future cash flows the asset is likely to 
generate, presupposing a discount rate and therefore a rate of profit. However in the 
R-BV as in neo-classical economics, the rate of profit follows from the possession of 
valuable assets. Wicksell effects and the associated problems of capital reversing and 
re-switching are important challenges to the R-BV, since they imply simultaneous 
equilibria where firms comprise different combinations of labour and capital at 
different rates of profit. If either labour or capital is a VRIN asset, the implication is 
that they are only likely to hold such status within a certain range of profit rates. 
These issues were raised in the ‘Cambridge controversies’, but never satisfactorily 
resolved (Cohen and Harcourt, 2003). 
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 An alternative approach is to value capital assets according to cost of 
production. Wicksell effects also bedevil this approach, because there is a periodic 
need to revalue the capital stock to reflect price and technology changes. However, 
from the MLTV-SCA perspective, these problems are less insuperable. Where a firm 
has heterogeneous competitive advantage assets, holding gains form a component of 
abnormal return. Nonetheless the valuation of all inputs involved in the creation of 
such assets remains problematic. Physical inputs are the easier to cost, but also the 
more easily replicable. Standardised human activity inputs, which are readily 
observable and easily variable by contractual arrangements, are also straightforward 
and the rate of return resembles the social risk free rate (figure 2). To the extent that 
special categories of skill are more likely sources of competitive advantage, consistent 
with the knowledge based view (Grant, 1996), and the relationship in figure 2, the 
required rate of return becomes a linear function of embedded fixed labour cost. 
Again this is relatively easy to quantify. Problems of asymmetric information, 
possession of tacit knowledge and monitoring costs impact on individual valuations, 
but the associated risks are diversifiable by investors and have no systematic impact 
on expected returns. Corporate boards can impose these expected returns on business 
units using output controls.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The argument presented above has accepted the main assumptions of the context 
based R-BV. It has also argued for the inclusion of labour process theory, asymmetric 
information and the analysis of risk, and the proposed MLTV. The combination of 
these elements shows that a resource-based theory must unite the process and content 
elements of strategy, through simultaneous interaction of labour management, the 
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determinants of SCA and relations with capital markets. It has shown that by utilising 
the MLTV, so that the employment of human resource creates value, but value 
creation process is in itself risky from the perspective of the monitoring employer and 
outside investor, a consistent theoretical approach can be applied to the theory of 
SCA. Without the links, advocated above, to LTV and labour process theory, and 
mechanisms of corporate governance, the R-BV remains merely a view and not a 
theory, because it lacks a consistent basis for asset valuation. The theory also explains 
that the roots of competitive advantage lie in the labour process, but with the corollary 
that maximizing the associated investment in tacit knowledge and associated difficult 
to replicate assets is fundamentally inconsistent with maximizing the value of 
shareholder’s investments. 
 There are several directions for further research. The Coasian approach 
advocated by Madhok (2002) represents an important contribution and can be usefully 
extended by further unpacking the firm into its stakeholder components and analysing 
the governance arrangements required to manage inter-stakeholder relations. The 
bargaining (M&R, 2004; L&R, 2003b) and payments (L&R, 2003a) perspectives can 
be extended by considering the relative bargaining power of insiders (as suggested by 
Coff, 1999). Such a perspective would facilitate the development of multiple 
stakeholder models, as extensions to the focus on the shareholder value in the 
narrowly focused theory of SCA presented above. All of these approaches are focused 
on value appropriation rather than value creation and all could usefully extend their 
perspectives in these directions. 
In summary, the R-BV is either not a theory of SCA, or if it is, it must reject 
the a priori assumptions of profit and utility maximization and that have underpinned 
neo-classical economics for the last 150 years. Instead the underlying source of value 
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in the labour process must be recognised and competitive advantage seen as the 
outcome of the unequal division of surplus between the creators and appropriators of 
value. If the R-BV can be a theory in these terms, it is a classical, not a neo-classical 
theory. 
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Figure 1: The production process, knowledge location and the distribution of surplus 
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Figure 3: The determinants of sustained competitive advantage and 
observable profits 
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 b) Resource characteristics and surplus appropriation 
Appropriation of surplus 
 
 
External 
 
Internal 
Tacit Quadrant 1 
• Observed profits: 
Abnormally high 
• SCA: Yes 
 
Quadrant 2 
• Observed profits: 
Normal 
• SCA: Yes 
 
Knowledge
resource 
base 
(VRIN 
assets) 
Explicit Quadrant 3 
• Observed profits: 
Normal 
• SCA: No 
 
Quadrant 4 
• Observed profits: 
Normal or losses 
• SCA: No 
 
 
 2
                                                  
Notes 
 
1 There is also disagreement amongst Marxist scholars as to whether Marx indeed did 
advocate the labour theory of value (Rowlinson and Hassard, 2001, pp.86-88). 
 
2 Socially necessary labour provides the link between the apparently supply side only 
CLTV and MLTV and the market. It is the required time for production under normal 
conditions of efficiency for a given society with that level of skill and labour intensity 
(Mohun, 1991). Or put another way, represents a social standard cost (Bryer, 1999) of 
producing what the customer is willing to pay for. If the socially necessary time is 
exceeded, for example through inefficiency, less surplus is realized and conversely 
more is realized where production is achieved in less time. 
 
3 Labour rents accrue to employees (and managers) where the wage rate exceeds the 
socially necessary labour. Where employees possess knowledge that is not easily 
replicable, particularly when routinized within the organization, possession of such 
knowledge provides workers with opportunities to raise real wages, if they can avoid 
accountability and appropriate the efficiency benefits (see for example efficiency 
wage theories, Katz, 1987). 
 
4 The emphasis here on the productive process, could lead to the conclusion that Marx 
ignored demand, but that was not the case. ‘The rule, that the labour time expended on 
a commodity should not exceed that which is socially necessary for its production, 
appears, in the production of commodities generally, to be established by the mere 
effect of competition; since to express ourselves superficially each single producer is 
obliged to sell his commodity at its market price.’ (Marx, 1976, p.465, emphasis 
added). 
 
5 As seniority increases managers may find more of their time allocated to non-
productive monitoring activities. 
 
6 Investment in strategic human resource assets (Mueller, 1996; Wright et al. 1994) is 
a sufficient but not a necessary condition for realized super-normal profits, since the 
employment of such assets simultaneously leads to the creation of internal rent 
appropriation possibilities. 
 
7 For Grant the firm is set of incentives for co-ordinating team production. Therefore 
where a soccer team has complementary skills, the team members need to be tied 
together by long-term relations (Grant 1996, p.113). The MLTV goes one-step 
further, recognizing that individuals understand their role in the team’s effort bargain 
and will resist the appropriation of surplus by external stakeholders.  
 
8 Firm specific risk is defined as the residual component of total risk not explained by 
generic economy wide factors systematically affecting all firms. 
 
9 It is assumed that labour is the only cost (so there is no variation for example in the 
organic composition of capital). Also it is assumed that there is a single period capital 
turnover (ie all the assets purchased at the beginning of the period are used up by the 
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end of the period). These assumptions are for brevity, but the model is generalizable 
when they are relaxed.  
 
10  Because labour cost co-varies perfectly with revenue, the residual, profit, is a fixed 
ratio of revenue. 
 
11  The precise relationship is rf x FCLR. FCLR in figure 2 and is also consistent with 
the covariance of the firm i profits with aggregate profits of all firms.  
 
12 Assuming unlimited product imitation, as a form of Bertrand competition, 
MacDonald and Ryall (2004) reach a similar conclusion. 
 
13 For example where abnormal returns from insider stock purchases rise as the firm's 
R&D intensity increases (Coff and Lee, 2003). 
 
14 The lack of a consistent theory of profit equalization has been a long-running 
problem for CLTV. In MLTV, differential risky profit rates arise in the productive 
process and are equalized through the capital market. 
 
15 Or more precisely, removing the reification, individual capitalists or investors 
cannot make abnormal returns. 
 
16 See Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) example utilizing interest costs. Moreover, as 
suggested by portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1959), the combination of two or more 
assets will always result a net reduction in portfolio variance unless the underlying 
cash flows of the individual assets are perfectly correlated. 
 
17 This criticism can also be applied to the payments perspective approach of Lippman 
and Rumelt (2003). 
 
18 The core is defined as the set of pay-offs that ensure the sub-set of pay-offs to any 
sub-set of players is greater than the maximum value available to that group working 
on its own (L&R, 2003b, p.1072). 
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